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THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF CAMERAS IN THE
COURTROOM
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently held in Chandler v. Florida,1 that absent
a showing of actual prejudice, it is not per se unconstitutional to televise
trials over the objection of the defendant.2 This decision has a direct
bearing on state court procedures, as over one-half of the states currently
permit television coverage of trials in one form or another.3 However,
sheer numbers supporting a proposition do not make that proposition
"right", nor does a Supreme Court decision upholding its constitutional-
ity imply an unqualified stamp of approval. In fact, previous Supreme
Court decisions have overturned convictions because the defendant's
right to a fair trial4 had been violated as a result of media coverage of his
case.
0
In order to protect this right, however, the defendant must prove on
appeal that such media coverage "compromised the ability of the particu-
lar jury. . . to adjudicate fairly."6 Accordingly, the defendant must rely
on the appellate process to protect his constitutionally guaranteed right
to a fair trial. He should not be required to do so. The Court admitted in
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart7 that the appellate process is the least
desirable means of redressing fair trial violations: "The costs of failure to
afford a fair trial are high. . . [A] reversal means that justice has been
delayed for both the defendant and the State .... Moreover, in border-
line cases in which the conviction is not reversed, there is some possibility
of an injustice unredressed."s
The "borderline cases" referred to in Nebraska Press Ass'n arise most
1. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
2. Id. at 580-83.
3. Twenty-six states now permit television coverage of trials: Alabama,* Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado,* Florida,* Georgia,* Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada,* New Hampshire,* New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,* Washington,* West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Those states marked with an asterisk have adopted a permanent rule. See Tornquist &
Grifall, Television in the Courtroom: Devil or Saint?, 17 WMLAME=r L. REv. 345, 346 n.5
(1981); Graves, Cameras in the Courts: The Situation Today, 63 JuD. 24, 25-27 (1979).
4. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
6. 449 U.S. at 575.
7. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
8. Id. at 555. See also Comment, From Estes to Chandler: Shifting the Constitutional
Burden of Courtroom Cameras to the States, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 315, 330-31 (1981).
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frequently when a conviction is challenged on the grounds that the tele-
vising of the trial denied the defendant a fair trial. These are borderline
cases because the psychological effects on all the trial participants are
numerous and intangible.9 For this reason they are difficult, if not impos-
sible, to prove with any particularity. Yet, the Court in Chandler imposed
that exact standard of proof. Moreover, the defendant may not be able to
afford to appeal a conviction and as a result might be denied a fair trial
with no viable recourse. It thus appears that the Court is not adequately
protecting the rights of the defendant.
The defendant is not the only person whose rights are affected by the
televising of trials. The effects on the trial judge, lawyers, witnesses and
jurors must also be considered.10 It is arguable that televising trials in-
trudes on their rights as well. Thus, a careful consideration of the effects
of televising a trial on all the trial participants is appropriate.
This comment briefly examines what effect the presence of cameras has
had on trials in the past, and analyzes the Chandler decision and its ef-
fect on the televising of trials in the future." Next, the media's alleged
right to televise trials is considered and shown to be subordinate to the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Finally, this comment looks at the various
effects that televising trials has on all of the trial participants in an at-
tempt to illustrate how such television coverage can impede the adminis-
tration of justice.
II. HISTORY
The roots of the current debate extend back fifty years. Of the trials
that involved television or other photographic coverage in the past, three
are most illustrative: State v. Hauptmann,12 Estes v. Texas,13 and Shep-
pard v. Maxwell.14
9. The psychological effects include: witnesses feeling nervous and self-conscious, thus im-
pairing their testimony; jurors feeling nervous and self-conscious, thus impairing their abil-
ity to determine guilt or innocence; lawyers "playing up" to the cameras, thus not affording
their client the best legal assistance possible; and judges having to supervise the cameras,
thus distracting their attention from the case at hand. See generally Tongue & Lintott, The
Case Against Cameras in the Courtroom, 16 WILLAmETr L. REv. 777 (1980).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. This comment focuses primarily on the problems associated with televising criminal
trials due largely to the fact that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair
and impartial trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. That right is unique to the criminal defendant
and must be considered when determining whether or not to televise a criminal trial. Aside
from this aspect of this comment, the discussion is equally applicable to the televising of
civil cases.
12. 115 ).J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935) (trial of the man
accused of kidnapping and murdering the two-year-old son of Charles A. Lindbergh).
13. 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (trial of a man accused of swindling).
14. 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (trial of a doctor accused of murdering his pregnant wife).
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Because of the notoriety of the victim in the Hauptmann case, media
coverage was intense and at times outrageous. 15 The inappropriate con-
duct of the photographers, which manifested itself both inside26 and
outside the courtroom,17 prompted the American Bar Association to draft
Canon 35, a proposed ban on all courtroom photography.18 However,
since the Canons are merely suggested guidelines and are not binding on
State Bar Associations, some states continued to televise trials. Regretta-
bly, Canon 35 was of no help to Hauptmann as he was convicted, his
appeal denied and his life taken.1 9
In 1965, the Supreme Court entered the arena when it decided Estes v.
Texas.20 Under the circumstances presented by this case the Court ruled
that the televising of a trial was an unconstitutional infringement on a
defendant's sixth amendment rights.21 The Court, in overturning Estes'
conviction, took into consideration the facts and circumstances of the
pretrial hearings.22 It recognized that there had been a "bombardment of
15. For an excellent discussion of the Hauptmann trial and its ramifications see
Kielbowicz, The Story Behind the Adoption of the Ban on Courtroom Cameras, 63 JuD. 14
(1979).
16. The conduct of the press included the filming of Hauptmann's interrogation at the
police station shortly after his arrest; the photographing of witnesses and jurors during re-
cesses (contrary to the judge's orders); the photographing of Lindbergh and his wife while
they were testifying (contrary to the judge's orders); and the filming of several days of the
trial, with sound, which was subsequently shown in movie theatres across the country. Id. at
17-19.
17. The entire city capitalized on the publicity. One writer observed that the "stores were
having a run on cameras, that local bars had fixed up a drink of apple-jack known as The
Hauptmann ... and that the sale of 'kidnap ladders' and miniature sleeping suits was pro-
gressing nicely." Benchley, Apres la Guerre Finie, NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 1935, at 44.
18. Kielbowicz, supra note 15, at 21-23. As subsequently amended in 1972 and embodied
in the Code of Judicial Conduct, the ban now reads (in pertinent part): "A judge should
prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and ar-
eas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between ses-
sions ..... " ABA CODE OF JUICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1972).
19. Hauptmann v. New Jersey, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
20. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Amid incredible publicity and intense coverage of the two-day
preliminary hearing and of the actual trial, Estes was convicted. He subsequently appealed
to the Supreme Court, alleging he had been denied a fair trial.
21. So much publicity had been generated that eleven volumes of press clippings were
filed with the clerk in support of a niotion for a change of venue. The motion was granted
and the case was tried in a county five hundred miles away. Despite this move, all the
courtroom seats were filled, and people stood in the aisles to watch the trial. Although all
cameramen were confined to a booth in the back of the courtroom, their activities contin-
ued. The opening and closing arguments of the state were broadcast live, the entire trial
(except for the arguments of the defense counsel to the jury) was filmed, and daily clips
were shown on the evening news. On at least one occasion the film of the day's proceedings
was shown in place of the late movie. Id. at 536-38.
22. Id. at 536. The Court said that broadcast of "[p]retrial [hearings] can create a major
problem for the defendant in a criminal case. Indeed, it may be more harmful than publicity
during the trial for it may well set the community opinion as to guilt or innocence." Another
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the community with the sights and sounds" of the hearing and, to a more
limited extent, of the trial.2 The actions of the defendant, 24 the lawyers
and the judge were highly publicized, and the intense coverage was said
to have set the trial apart in the public's mind as an extraordinary case.25
The Court explained that
the chief function of our judicial machinery is to ascertain the truth. The
use of television, however, cannot be said to contribute materially to this
objective. Rather its use amounts to the injection of an irrelevant factor into
court proceedings. In addition, experience teaches that there are numerous
situations in which it might cause actual unfairness - some so subtle as to
defy detection by the accused or control by the judge.26
In conclusion, the Court stated that "[a] defendant on trial for a specific
crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or a city or nation-
wide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and televi-
sion coverage will inevitably result in prejudice. Trial by television is,
therefore, foreign to our system. ' '27 Accordingly, there was no need for the
defendant to show actual prejudice in order to have his conviction
reversed.
Chief Justice Warren concurred with the majority opinion and ex-
plained that televising a trial is unconstitutional in
(1) that the televising of trials diverts the trial from its proper purpose in
that it has an inevitable impact on all the trial participants; (2) that it gives
the public the wrong impression about the purpose of trials, thereby de-
tracting from the dignity of court proceedings and lessening the reliability
of trials; and (3) that it singles out certain defendants and subjects them to
trials under prejudicial conditions not experienced by others."
He also agreed that a defendant should not be required on appeal to
prove actual prejudice. "The prejudice of television may be so subtle that
it escapes the ordinary methods of proof, but it would gradually erode our
fundamental conception of trial. A defendant may be unable to prove
that he was actually prejudiced by a televised trial. ...",9
important fact was that four of the jurors empaneled had seen all or most of the broadcasts
of the pretrial hearings. Id. at 538.
23. Id. at 538.
24. As he arrived each day the defendant was badgered outside the courthouse by report-
ers trying to get a statement. Inside, apart from the constant coverage of the trial, on one
occasion a photographer was caught "zooming in" over the defendant's shoulder trying to
determine what he was reading. Id. at 577-78 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
25. Id. at 538.
26. Id. at 544-45. The Court enumerated some of the psychological effects of televising
trials: distraction of jurors, intimidation of witnesses, additional pressure and responsibility
on judges, and adverse shaping of public opinion against a defendant. Id. at 545-50.
27. Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
29. Id. at 578 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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One year later in Sheppard v. Maxwell,"0 the Court again held that the
widespread publicity resulting from televising a criminal trial, inherently
could deprive a defendant of a fair trial.3 1 After some outlandish report-
ing by the media of the investigation,2 inquest 3 and trial,M Sheppard
was convicted. He subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.3 5
After reviewing the facts of the case, the Court was prompted to label
the trial as having been conducted in a "carnival atmosphere."3" It re-
versed the conviction without requiring the defendant to show actual
prejudice,37 and stated that
[d]ue process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury
free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modem communi-
cations and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of
the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the accused.-
Thus, the Court continued to recognize the inherent dangers in broadcast
30. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
31. Id. at 352-55. The Court's description of the facts should be read in full to appreciate
the full impact of what transpired.
32. Attention and suspicion focused on Sheppard immediately after the killing. One local
newspaper declared that somebody is "getting away with murder" and demanded an in-
quest. The coroner called one that same day. Id. at 338.
33. The inquest was held in a school gymnasium. Reporters and photographers were re-
served a place in the front of the room, and the inquest was broadcast live. Sheppard was
questioned for more than five hours in the three-day inquest about the night of the murder,
his married life with his wife, and an alleged extramarital affair. His attorneys were present
during the inquest, but were not allowed to participate. When one of his attorneys at-
tempted to introduce some documents into the record, "he was forcibly ejected from the
room by the Coroner, who received cheers, hugs, and kisses from ladies in the audience." Id.
at 340. Three weeks after the killing, the papers demanded Sheppard's arrest. One newspa-
per, hungry for a conviction, ran an article entitled Quit Stalling-Bring Him In! Later that
night Sheppard was arrested. Id. at 341.
34. Sheppard was brought to trial just two weeks before the general election in which the
trial judge was a candidate to succeed himself and the chief prosecutor was a candidate for a
different judgeship. When the jurors were empaneled, their names and addresses were pub-
lished in the paper. All of them subsequently received letters and phone calls about the
ensuing prosecution. At the trial, a table was set up a few feet from the jury box and defense
table to accommodate about twenty reporters. Although picture-taking was prohibited while
court was in session, still and newsreel pictures were taken of the judge, jurors, witnesses,
and defendant as they entered and left the courthouse each day. One television station even
staged an interview with the judge as he entered the courthouse. Id. at 342-44.
35. Sheppard was convicted in 1954 and spent 10 years in jail after the Supreme Court
originally denied certiorari. Sheppard v. Ohio, 352 U.S. 910 (1956). In 1964, the United
States District Court granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he
was denied a fair trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 346
F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
36. 384 U.S. at 358.
37. Id. at 352-55.
38. Id. at 362.
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coverage of trials and did not require the defendant, on appeal, to prove
how he actually was prejudiced. That approach, however, ended with the
Chandler decision.
III. ANALYSIS OF Chandler v. Florida
Chandler v. Florida39 involved a constitutional challenge to Florida's
revised Canon 3A(7),'40 which permitted the televising of trials. The de-
fendants were convicted as charged and appealed their convictions, with-
out success, through the Florida courts up to the Supreme Court of the
United States.41 At no time did they present any evidence of specific
prejudice.42 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, requiring that actual
evidence of prejudice be presented before a conviction could be over-
turned. Chief Justice Burger wrote: "An absolute constitutional ban on
broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified simply because there is a
danger that, in some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial and
trial events may impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or
innocence uninfluenced by extraneous matter."'43 He noted, however, that
the defendant's rights are protected by his showing on appeal that "the
media's coverage of his case . . . compromised the ability of the particu-
lar jury that heard the case to adjudicate fairly."4 4
Thus, the defendant is forced to rely on the appellate process to protect
his right to a fair trial. However, the Supreme Court itself has recognized
the inadequacy of the appellate process in this regard. In Sheppard, the
Court said: "[W]e must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the
cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that
39. 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The case involved the trial of two Miami policemen for conspir-
acy to commit burglary and grand larceny. The case attracted wide-spread media coverage
in the Miami area, and, over the objection of the defendants, the trial was televised.
40. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). As revised by
that case, Canon 3A(7) reads in part: "Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding
judge ... electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in
the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be allowed ..... Id. at 781.
41. The defendants first appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeals on the grounds
that the television coverage denied them their right to a fair and impartial trial. However,
since they did not present any evidence of specific prejudice, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction. Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The Supreme
Court of Florida denied review. Chandler v. State, 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979), citing its
holding in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d at 771-74, that absent an
actual showing of prejudice, it is not unconstitutional to televise a trial.
42. They instead were arguing for a ruling that it is per se unconstitutional to televise a
trial over the objection of the defendant. 376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979); 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
43. 449 U.S. at 574-75.
44. Id.
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will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences."4 The
appellate process cannot afford an appropriate remedy, because in many
instances, the damage has already been done. And in those cases where
the defendant cannot afford to appeal, whatever remedy might have been
available to him is meaningless.
The inherent unfairness of the Chandler decision is the burden of proof
it places on the defendant. On appeal he must produce evidence of spe-
cific prejudice in support of his contention that he was denied a fair
trial. 8 Yet, because of the psychological nature of the factors affected,
specific proof is difficult if not impossible to produce.47 The Court in Es-
tes recognized the potential prejudicial problems television could create.
"Television . .. by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in
which it may cause prejudice to an accused. Still one cannot put his finger
on its specific mischief and prove with particularity wherein he was
prejudiced.' 48 With this in mind, the majority in Estes chose not to re-
quire that the defendant show actual prejudice.49
The Court in Chandler, however, also realized that the psychological
problems associated with televising trials might be difficult to prove with
particularity.
Inherent in electronic coverage of a trial is a risk that the very awareness by
the accused of the coverage and the contemplated broadcast may adversely
affect the conduct of the participants and the fairness of the trial, yet leave
no evidence of how the conduct or the trial's fairness was affected.50
Cognizant of the possibility that the defendant may be prejudiced and
not be able to prove it, the Court nevertheless required on appeal that the
defendant present evidence of specific prejudice.5 1 In Estes, Chief Justice
Warren mentioned some of the problems associated with the televising of
trials and noted that a defendant may be unable to prove actual prejudice
in many cases.
How is the defendant to prove that the prosecutor acted differently than he
ordinarily would have, that defense counsel was more concerned with im-
pressing prospective clients than with the interests of the defendant, that a
juror was so concerned with how he appeared on television that his mind
continually wandered from the proceedings, that an important defense wit-
ress made a bad impression on the jury because he was "playing" to the
television audience, or that the judge was a little more lenient or a little
more strict than he usually might be? And then, how is petitioner to show
45. 384 U.S. at 363.
46. 449 U.S. at 575-82.
47. See notes 9 and 26 supra and accompanying text.
48. 381 U.S. at 544.
49. Id. at 550-52.
50. 449 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 582.
1982] 873
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[on appeal] that this combination of changed attitudes diverted the trial
sufficiently from its purpose to deprive him of a fair trial?52
The decision in Chandler appears to be concerned more with the
State's right to experiment than the rights of the criminal defendant.
Chief Justice Burger wrote: "[t]o stay experimentation in things social
and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. '5 3 It appears the
Court did not want to decide the issue, and instead, shifted the responsi-
bility of ensuring the defendant a fair trial to the states. In this respect,
Chandler is at odds with previous Supreme Court decisions that prohibit
the states from setting guide lines to protect a defendant's constitutional
rights in order to promulgate a more uniform federal requirement. 4 In
light of the above considerations, the Chandler decision appears to be an
aberration or perhaps a sign of things to come.
IV. THE MEDIA'S RIGHT TO COVER TRIALS
A. Competing First and Sixth Amendment Rights
The question of whether or not to televise trials balances the media's
first amendment right to report on trials against the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a fair trial.5 This balance should tip in favor of the
accused. Although the Constitution accords equal weight to each amend-
ment, the Supreme Court when faced with this dilemma has indicated
that the right to a fair trial must always be protected.56 In Sheppard, the
Court said the balance between first and sixth amendment rights must
"never [be] weighed against the accused. '57 In Estes, the Court referred
to the guarantees of the sixth amendment as "the most fundamental of
all freedoms."5" Even in Nebraska Press Ass'n, where the Court found
the balance to be tipped in favor of the protection of first amendment
rights, it was recognized that first amendment rights are not absolute,
52. 381 U.S. at 579 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
53. 449 U.S. at 579 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Hiebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
54. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (individual must be informed of his
right against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defen-
dant entitled to court-appointed attorney). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 326.
55. A detailed analysis of these competing rights is beyond the scope of this comment.
For a good discussion on this topic, see generally Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The
Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REV. 485 (1977); Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An
Opportunity for Co-existence, 29 STAN. L. REv. 561 (1977); Comment, Balancing Right to
Fair Trial Against Statutory Right of Public Access to Court Proceedings After Gannett,
14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1403 (1980).
56. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
57. 384 U.S. at 362.
58. 381 U.S. at 540. See also Erickson, supra note 55, at 486.
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and may necessarily yield to the defendant's right to a fair trial in certain
instances. 9
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia60 held that the first amend-
ment not only protects speech and press, but also gives the public and the
media the right to attend trials. However, as stated by Justice Stewart:
[T]his does not mean that the first amendment right of members of the
public and representatives of the press to attend civil and criminal trials is
absolute. Just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place and man-
ner restrictions upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms, so may a
trial judge impose reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted occupation
of a courtroom by representatives of the press and members of the public."
Thus, in those cases where first and sixth amendment guarantees conflict,
the sixth amendment right to a fair trial should weigh heavier in the
balance.
B. The "Right" To Educate the Public
It is asserted by the media that televising a case would better educate
the public as to what actually transpires during a trial. Since recent pub-
lic opinion polls reflect the public's low opinion of lawyers, judges and the
court system in general, it is arguable that the public's opinion and confi-
dence in the system can be improved by educating the people as to what
goes on behind the courtroom doors. 2 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. lends
some support to this argument.
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institu-
tions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing. When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least
an opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its work-
ings in a particular case.6 3
Television reporters also point to recent surveys indicating television to
be the number one news source for most of the American public,"4 and
claim that trials should be televised in order to accomodate the majority.
59. 427 U.S. at 562-70. The Court stated that restrictions could be put on the press' exer-
cise of its first amendment rights if no other alternative was available to protect the sixth
amendment right of a defendant.
60. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
61. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. See Tomquist & Grifall, supra note 3, at 365-66. See also K. DEVOL, MAsS MEDIA AND
THE SuPREME COURT. THE LEGACY OF THE WARREN YEARS 313 (1976); Loewen, Cameras in
the Courtroom: A Reconsideration, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 504, 512-13 (1978).
63. 448 U.S. at 572.
64. D'Alemberte, Cameras in the Courtroom? Yes, 7 BARRISTER 6, 8 (Spring 1980) (citing
tests conducted by A.C. Nielson, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Roper
Organization, Inc.).
1982] 875
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The counterargument maintains that television broadcasters are not in-
terested in educating the people but rather seek primarily to provide en-
tertainment. 5 Rarely, if ever, will an entire trial be broadcast on televi-
sion. Instead, one or two minute "spots" on the evening news will be
devoted to a trial. Such random selections from a trial will not serve to
educate, but rather may misinform the public.66 Justice Warren in Estes
also realized that the televising of trials might become a form of
entertainment.
The televising of trials would cause the public to equate the trial process
with the forms of entertainment regularly seen on television and with the
commercial objectives of the television industry .... In addition, if trials
were televised there would be a natural tendency on the part of broadcast-
ers to develop the personalities of the trial participants so as to give the
proceedings more of an element of drama."
The few cases that are broadcast in their entirety will, because of the
necessity of sponsorship, be those that best attract the public's interest
because of the personalities involved or the unique facts of the case. Ac-
cordingly, the "educational" benefits of broadcasting such cases will be
minimal. As Justice Harlan said in Estes:
[T]he public's interest in viewing the trial is likely to be engendered more
by curiosity about the personality of the well-known figure who is the defen-
dant ... or about the details of the particular crime involved, than by [an]
innate curiosity to learn about the workings of the judicial process itself."8
V. THE EFFECT OF TELEVISING ON THE TRIAL PARTICIPANTS
A. Trial Judge and Attorneys
The trial judge would be affected by the televising of a trial as he must
assume the additional responsibility of supervising all aspects of the
broadcast, in order to ensure that it does not interfere with the trial. The
Estes Court recognized that "[tihe telecasting of a trial. diverts [the
judge's] attention from the task at hand-the fair trial of the accused."6"
The physical distractions associated with the mechanics of broadcast-
ing, however, are but one category of the additional problems that con-
front the judge. The initial decision of whether or not to allow televising,
65. See Day, The Case Against Cameras in the Courtroom, 20 JUDOES J. 18, 19-20 (1981).
66. Id. at 20. Judge Day does not support the proposition that educating the public (even
if accomplished) is a valid reason to televise trials. "The judicial process is not designed or
intended to educate, inform, or entertain the public. It is a search for truth." Id. at 19. See
also Sutro, TV Cameras in the Courtroom, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, April 17, 1978,
at 51.
67. 381 U.S. at 571 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
68. Id. at 594 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 548.
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in those states which permit it, is within the judge's discretion.70 This
decision, by its nature, will be subject to pressure from the television sta-
tions. This is especially true in the large number of states where judges
are elected. Justice Douglas, in a law review article, discussed this
problem:
There is pressure these days on courts all over the land to put trials and
hearings on radio and television. In one state the radio and TV industry
leveled their guns at a court which had banned these broadcasts. At fifteen
minute intervals there were spot announcements over the air reminding the
people that 'the courts do not belong to the lawyers' and urging the listeners
to get busy and write the members of the court to change the rule."
Judges should not be subject to this kind of political pressure.
The political power of television can be used by a judge as well as
against him. At election time, he may want the people to see how well he
handles a trial, and for this reason might permit the televising of a trial of
great notoriety. 2 This would create a pressure upon other judges to do
the same.7
3
If a trial is televised, the judge may succumb to the public's demands
for a conviction. He might allow the admission of evidence warranting
constitutional exclusion. 4 This may be an especially strong temptation in
a contested election year, the presiding judge realizing that the public
neither understands constitutional law nor approves of defendants being
acquitted on technicalities."5
Nor are attorneys immune from the temptation of using a televised
trial as a forum. They may "play up" to the viewing audience or choose to
cross-examine a witness, knowing that neither is in the best interest of his
client, simply to "show-off. '76 The public prosecutor (elected in many
states) may choose to prosecute a case simply to impress his electorate
watching on television.7 7 Televising trials inherently presents these
dangers.
70. See, e.g., In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 781 (Fla. 1979).
Florida Canon 3A(7) was revised to read, in part: "Subject at all times to the authority of
the presiding judge ... electronic media and still photography coverage ... shall be al-
lowed." Id.
71. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. R.V. 1, 1 (1960).
72. Because of the problems evidenced in the Sheppard and Estes trials, this type of case
should not be televised.
73. 381 U.S. at 549.
74. Although this may be grounds for reversal on appeal, the defendant should not be
required to rely on the appellate process to protect a right that should be guarded at the
trial level. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
75. See Hirschhorn, Cameras in the Courtroom? No, 7 BARRISTER 7, 56 (Spring 1980).
76. Janus, Fair Trial - Free Press: What Price Justice?, 5 VA. BAR ASS'N J. 8, 12 (1979).
See also 381 U.S. at 549.
77. See Janus, supra note 76, at 12.
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B. Witnesses
Televising a trial may effect a witness in several ways. First, the witness
may be distracted while testifying. It is argued that such distractions are
minimal today with the technological advances in the television equip-
ment that is used;7 8 however, the physical distractions caused by the
equipment are not the sole problem. A serious concern arises from the
mere presence of the cameras. As the Court in Estes noted, "distractions
are not caused solely by the physical presence of the camera and its tell-
tale red lights. . . . It is the awareness of the fact of telecasting" that the
witness feels throughout the trial.7 9 In his concurrence, Chief Justice
Warren went further to say:
Whether they do so consciously or subconsciously, all trial participants act
differently in the presence of television cameras. And, even if all partici-
pants make a conscientious and studied effort to be unaffected by the pres-
ence of television, this effort in itself prevents them from giving their full
attention to their proper function at trial. Thus, the evil of televised trials
... lies not in the noise and appearance of the cameras, but in the trial
participants' awareness that they are being televised.80
Recent surveys support Chief Justice Warren's view. One such survey of
trial participants, conducted by the Cleveland Bar Association, found
that a significant number of witnesses admitted not only to being aware
of the presence of the television cameras during their testimony, but also
to being distracted, nervous, and self-conscious."
The natural result of such witness response is a decline in the quality of
their testimony. Even "seasoned" actors experience a form of stage fright
when appearing before television cameras.82 A witness who has never ap-
peared before a television camera may very well be too frightened to tes-
tify. The Estes Court recognized this danger when it stated:
The quality of the testimony. . . will often be impaired. The impact upon a
witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is sim-
ply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and
given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking pub-
licly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. Embarrass-
ment may impede the search for the truth, as may a natural tendency to-
78. See 370 So. 2d at 775. See also Loewen, supra note 62, at 509-12.
79. 381 U.S. at 546.
80. Id. at 569-70 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
81. Results of survey of trial participants conducted by Cleveland Bar Association in
1980, reprinted in Day, supra note 65, at 21, 51.
82. Lyman & Scott, Stage Fright and the Problem of Identity, in DRAMA IN LIn: THE
USES OF COMMUNICATION IN SocmrY 136-37 (J. Combs & M. Mansfield ed. 1976). "Stage
fright" was defined as "a consciousness of one's own limitations, at a moment when limita-
tions of any sort place a barrier between what one wants to do and what one can do." Id. at
136 (quoting Heylbut, How to Abolish Fear Before Audiences, ETUDE, Jan., 1939, at 12).
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ward overdramatization.8
Another way in which the witness may be affected by the televising of
trials is that he may consciously alter his testimony in response to watch-
ing other witnesses testify on television, 4 so as to make his testimony
more persuasive 5 or simply to conform with previous testimony in order
to avoid appearing foolish on television."6 A witness may also change his
testimony in response to pressure from friends and neighbors, watching
the trial on television, that he testify in a certain way so as to influence
the jury to reach the "proper" decision.87
Another important, yet little-considered, concern is the witness's right
to privacy. Although not addressed in Chandler, this right has been rec-
ognized by other authorities who note that forcing witnesses to testify
before television cameras may constitute an invasion of this right.88 They
may be approached on the street by strangers, who saw them on televi-
sion, demanding an explanation for their testimony.8 " Justice Douglas
wrote that if witnesses are forced to appear on television against their
will, "then their essential dignity as human beings is being violated." 90
Justice Stewart, dissenting in Estes, admitted that "[c]onstitutional
problems of another kind might arise if a witness . . . were subjected to
being televised over his objection." 9' 1
An additional problem is that witnesses may refuse to testify because of
the television camera. Even without the camera this is not an uncommon
problem. Many potential witnesses fear testifying because of possible em-
83. 381 U.s. at 547. See also Janus, supra note 76, at 11; Tongue & Lintott, supra note 9,
at 790-92.
84. 381 U.S. at 547.
85. See Tongue & Lintott, supra note 9, at 791-92.
86. See Janus, supra note 76, at 11. Psychological tests conducted show that a person
may change his belief or conduct when he is the only one in a group with that belief or
conduct. Test results also indicate that the more "public" that belief or conduct becomes,
the more he is likely to be influenced or pressured to change. See B. KOLASA, INTRODUCTION
TO BEHAVIORAL SCmNCES FOR BUSINESS 458-60 (1969). Thus, if a witness were to testify op-
posite of what everyone else had or would, he may change his testimony, knowing that he
might look foolish on television as the odd person in the group.
87. See Note, Televised Trials: Constitution Constraints, Practical Implications, and
State Experimentation, 9 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 910, 928 (1978).
88. For a discussion of the background of this asserted right, see generally Gerety, Rede-
fining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233 (1977); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383 (1960); Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); Note,
Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973). The Supreme Court itself recog-
nized that a penumbra of rights does exist with respect to privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
89. 381 U.S. at 547.
90. Douglas, supra note 71, at 7.
91. 381 U.S. at 613 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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barrassment. Others simply do not want to "get involved. 9 2 Often wit-
nesses must be subpoenaed to testify. The addition of television cameras
into the courtroom can only serve to magnify the problem.9 3 Competent
witnesses are needed for just adjudication. Anything that might prevent a
witness from testifying ought to be avoided.
It is contended that the problem of witnesses refusing to testify be-
cause of objection to being televised can be alleviated because, in most
states, the judge has the discretionary power to prohibit the televising of
certain witnesses.9 4 However, if trial judges fail to prohibit the televising
of witnesses in appropriate situations, this could serve as a deterrent to
future witnesses in similar situations."
C. Jurors
The effect of televising a trial on the jurors is of critical importance as
it will be these men and women who decide the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal trial. Along with feeling nervous or self-conscious,
many jurors (as many as fifty percent in one survey) fear physical harm
as a result of the decision they make.' It is hard to imagine that the
juror, arguably the most important element in the search for truth, can
give his undivided attention to the case at hand when he is in fear for his
personal safety, a fear magnified when one's face is being transmitted
throughout the entire community, state, or nation.
Besides distracting the jurors' attention, televising a trial creates an-
other problem in that it brings public opinion into the decision-making
process. 97 Chief Justice Warren in Estes recognized this potential danger:
Broadcasting in the courtroom would give the television industry an awe-
some power to condition the public mind either for or against an accused.
92. See Scaring Off Witnesses, TIME, Sept. 11, 1978, at 41. See also Tongue & Lintott,
supra note 9, at 790.
93. See Sutro, supra note 66, at 51.
94. See, e.g., In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d at 779. The revised
Florida Canon 3A(7) reads in part:
The presiding judge may exclude electronic media coverage of a particular participant
only upon a finding that such coverage will have a substantial effect upon the particu-
lar individual which would be qualitatively different from the effect on members of
the public in general and such effect will be qualitatively different from coverage of
other types of media.
Id.
95. 370 So. 2d at 778. The Florida Supreme Court made specific mention of three cases
where the trial judge refused requests by witnesses and victims not to have their testimonies
televised. The refusal was upheld in each case. One case involved the widow of a murder
victim; another involved a prison inmate who feared retaliation; and the third involved a
sixteen year-old rape victim. Id.
96. Day, supra note 65, at 21, 51.
97. Note, supra note 87, at 928.
880 [Vol. 16:867
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
By showing only those parts of its films or tapes which depict the defendant
or his witnesses in an awkward or unattractive position, television directors
could give the community, state, or country a false and unfavorable impres-
sion of the man on trial.98
Another legal writer observed that "not only would television bring with
it to the courtroom the specter of public opinion, but it could at the same
time shape that opinion."9 9 The danger is that the jurors, subject to pres-
sure from that public opinion, may tailor their verdicts in accordance
with it. Psychological studies reveal that people will succumb to such
pressure and conform their opinions to that of the perceived group be-
lief.100 This danger is magnified when the decision to be made is widely
publicized.1 1' In essence, televising a trial that the public believes ought
to result in a conviction creates external pressure to convict.
D. The Defendant
The defendant in a criminal trial has a sixth amendment, constitutional
right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. From the preceding discus-
sion, it should be apparent that the televising of a trial may adversely
affect the judge, attorneys, witnesses, or jurors. If this occurs, then the
defendant has been denied a fair trial. 10 Since the Court in Chandler'0 3
refused to ban the broadcasting of trials in all cases, if the defendant
believes that his sixth amendment right has been violated by the televis-
ing of his trial, he will be required to prove on appeal exactly how the
media coverage "compromised the ability of the jury to judge him
fairly."'1 0 4 When the factors that can adversely affect the fairness of a trial
are psychological, the defendant will have a difficult time proving their
existence and their effect on the trial participants with any particular-
ity."0 5 He may thus be deprived of a fair trial without the means of prov-
ing it.
If the defendant does manage to have his conviction overturned on ap-
peal, he may have a difficult time finding uninformed impartial jurors for
a retrial."'0 A recent experiment reveals that many prospective jurors
98. 381 U.S. at 574 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
99. Note, supra note 87, at 928.
100. KOLASA, supra note 86, at 458-60. See also Katzer, Cameras in the Courtroom: The
Kansas Opposition, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 230, 238 (1979).
101. Katzer, supra note 100, at 238.
102. See generally Note, Televising Criminal Trial of Widespread Public Interest Inher-
ently Deprives Defendant of Due Process, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 329 (1965).
103. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
104. Id. at 580.
105. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text. See also Douglas, supra note 71, at
10. Writing on the subject, he said when "the trial is opened up to broadcasting and televi-
sion, the damage done may be too subtle to measure accurately." Id.
106. See Note, supra note 87, at 928-29.
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enter a second trial remembering facts from the first trial that are both
incorrect and prejudicial. 10 7 A change of venue would be mandatory, but
with cases drawing widespread media coverage, such a change in venue
would fail to eliminate the prejudice.
Televising a trial does nothing more than turn public opinion against a
defendant. Such adverse public opinion spawns pressure to convict.10s
This is not conducive to the notion of a fair trial. Justice Douglas once
wrote: "A man on trial for his life or liberty needs protection from the
mob. Mobs are not interested in the administration of justice. They have
base appetites to satisfy."'' 09 He concluded that "[s]ince the defendant's
rights are the interests protected by the public trial, the end is best
served by banning all photography, broadcasting, and television." 10
VI. THE FUTURE OF CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM
Despite all the potential problems and dangers associated with televis-
ing trials, many states like Florida continue to permit such coverage. This
is due, at least in part, to the lack of definitive data regarding the psycho-
logical effects of televising trials on the trial participants."' The Court in
Chandler recognized this fact and made clear that if empirical data
should become available proving the adverse effects of televising trials, a
different result would be warranted.
If it could be demonstrated that the mere presence of photographic and
recording equipment and the knowledge that the event would be broadcast
invariably and uniformly affected the conduct of participants so as to im-
pair fundamental fairness, our task would be simple; prohibition of broad-
cast coverage of trials would be required. 112
This language should prompt a study of the psychological effects of tel-
evising trials. More surveys need to be made and more data collected.
Until such definitive data is available, criminal trials should not be broad-
cast over the objection of the defendant. The defendant's right to a fair
trial ought to be protected against any risk of prejudice.113 A survey of
107. See Netteburg, Does Research Support the Estes Ban on Cameras in the Court-
room?, 63 JuDicATupm 467, 472-75 (1980). That statistic was the result of a survey taken
after the Wisconsin trial of Jennifer Patri. She was tried for murder and arson but was
convicted of murder only. People who had seen the trial on television responded to ques-
tions on various aspects of it. Fifty-nine percent of the people surveyed incorrectly thought
that Patri had been convicted on both charges. Id. at 474. Recall of such "facts" by jurors at
a second trial would be highly prejudicial.
108. See notes 96-101 supra and accompanying text.
109. Douglas, supra note 71, at 6.
110. Id. at 10.
111. See In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d at 775-76.
112. 449 U.S. at 575.
113. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 551-56. In attempting to protect that
right, the Court cited a type of "balancing" test promulgated by Justice Learned Hand.
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attorneys taken by the Cleveland Bar Association indicated that a major-
ity of them believe that the consent of all the parties should be secured
before televising a trial. A smaller majority also believed that the consent
of the witnesses and victims should likewise be secured." 4 Acquiring such
consent, though admittedly difficult, would ensure judicial efficiency and
would create less grounds for appeal, thus encouraging finality.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are many problems associated with the televising of trials, espe-
cially criminal trials. Of paramount importance is the possibility of deny-
ing the defendant a fair and impartial trial. The possible adverse effects
of such televising on the judge, attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and public
opinion in general put the ability to conduct a fair trial in jeopardy.
These psychological effects can do much to change the complexion of a
case and yet leave no observable evidence of their existence. Accordingto
the decision in Chandler, the defendant on appeal must prove the exis-
tence of such psychological factors with particularity. This is clearly an
unfair and unreasonable burden.
Admittedly, there is insufficient empirical data concerning the psycho-
logical effects, on the trial participants, of televising a trial. Although pro-
ponents view this as reason enough for continuing to televise trials,115 it
is, to the contrary, justification for prohibiting the televising of a trial
over the objection of the defendant. He may very well be denied a fair
trial without the ability to prove it. For this reason and until more data is
collected and analyzed and the effects of televising actually known, tele-
vising a trial, over the objection of the defendant, should be prohibited.
Robert J. Fuoco
According to that test, the balance would tip in favor of the defendant in a particular case if
"[t]he gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 554. Thus, the Court was concerned with
the possibility of harm to the defendant and sought to guard against it.
114. Day, supra note 65, at 51.
115. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. at 575-80.
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